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24 June 1963

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# CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN



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
24 June 1963

**CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN**

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## CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

24 June 1963

### DAILY BRIEF

USSR - Communist China: The Soviet party apparently continues to believe that the best way to blunt the renewed Chinese attack is to maintain its pose as the champion of unity and nonpolemics.

The decision of the recently concluded plenum of the Soviet central committee displayed Soviet anger at the arrogance of the Chinese Communist 14 June letter more clearly than did Moscow's initial expression of "regret." Although the decision accused the Chinese of "groundless, slanderous" attacks on the Soviet party, its main purpose was to make it appear that the Chinese had broken an agreement not to engage in open polemics. The Soviet party, while noting that its delegates to the forthcoming meeting with the Chinese will maintain the entire Soviet line, refused even to counter the blatant Chinese criticism of internal Soviet policies with a charge of interference in the affairs of other parties.

The relatively restrained Soviet reaction in the face of such open provocation suggests that Moscow fears that a renewal of the polemics will lead to greater Chinese successes in Peiping's drive for supporters within the international Communist movement. Uruguayan Communist party leader Arismendi, reporting to his party on his recent visit to the Soviet Union, said that Moscow was convinced that nothing would come of its talks with the Chinese and that as a result the Communist movement would split even further. Therefore, Arismendi said, the Uruguayan party must be prepared to purge its ranks of supporters of the Chinese line to prevent them from taking over the party.

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South Vietnam: (There is increasing doubt whether President Diem's 16 June agreement with Buddhist leaders will be implemented.)

(Diem's brother Nhu, who has opposed concessions to the Buddhists, reportedly has ordered the government-sponsored Republican Youth group to launch a protest movement against the agreement. [redacted])

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[redacted] the President, in a meeting with the American chargé on 22 June, denied any attempt by Nhu to sabotage the agreement and asserted flatly that it would be honored. He implied, however, that some Buddhist youths involved in recent rioting would be prosecuted.)

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(Buddhist leaders have stated publicly that they will give the government two weeks to show signs of its good faith over the agreement. They are reported increasingly convinced, however, that the government is trying to discredit them. They have claimed in particular that many of the youths under detention are being pressured to sign statements linking Buddhist leaders with the Communists.)

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DAILY BRIEF

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The Under Secretary of State

The Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs

The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs

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